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ventures such as hotels, real estate business, tourism resorts and casinos, and held by 
through CLOB reportedly totaled about 144 billion shares valued at S$229 billion 
(US$134.70 billion) since it started trading on January 2,1999 (Toh, 1999). 
According to the Stock Exchange of Singapore journal, CLOB shares as of September 
15, 1998, were valued at RM$29.2 billion or US$7.68 billion with an account of 172,419 
CLOB investors. The KLSE announced on December 31, 1998, that Singapore's Central 
Depository (CDP) will be recognized as an authorized nominee for CLOB shares until 
the end of 1999. The Malaysian government claimed that the trading of CLOB shares was 
used for speculative attacks on the Malaysian stock exchange and if such trading would 
have continued it could have triggered a massive sell down in Malaysian shares. The 
tying of the Malaysian shares held by Singaporean investors and to make it a matter of 
government-to-government issue would boost the stability of the stock markets of both 
Malaysia and Singapore. However, restricting the shareholders that held stocks in the 
the KLSE the whole of year 1999 thus dampened tourism development in Malaysia. 
Implications for the Tourism Sector 
While other factors have been at work, such as political uncertainty, environmental 
pollution, health risks and competitive pressures, there is a strong link between economic 
movements and the state of the tourism sector. Before the implementation of the capital 
controls in September 1998, the industry was already experiencing a serious decline in 
growth rates compared to earlier years of the decade. In 1994, tourism made up 4.6% of 
( ~ ~ $ 3 . 5 6  billion) compared with RM$4.5 billion-(~~$1'78 billion) in 1990. creating some 
120.000 new jobs created so that tourism became the second largest foreign exchange 
trols represent an added complication. Malaysia's 1999 budget allocates ~ ~ $ 1 7 0  million 
with 6.8 million in 1998. The tourists spent RM$2.5 billion (US$667 million) shovvine in 
Hotel sector in Malaysia contributed RM$2.96 billion ( ~ ~ $ 7 7 9  million) or 31.8% of the 
RM$9.34 (US$2.45 billion) earnings from the tourism industry. Although there was a 
167.9% increase in tourist arrivals from Singapore, China (137.2 % ), the Netherlands 
(108.8%), Germany (91.6%), UK (91.1%) and Japan (73.4%) for 1998, that is no guarantee 
that tourists will come back automatically and already there is some evidence of the new 
restrictions affecting visitors. 
The rules require travelers to declare the amount of money in their possession 
when entering or leaving Malaysia. Under the ruling introduced, all travelers including 
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Malaysians have to obtain clearance for specific amounts noted above from state customs 
officers. The Tourism Authority of Thailand claims Malaysian visitor arrivals have 
dropped 70% due to these rulings. At the Singapore-Malaysian Causeway, the travelers 
complain that customs officials enforcing the currency exchange regulations exacerbate 
existing congestion of foot passengers and traffic. 
Withn the context of tourism, there are two main objectives of imposing capital con- 
trols and currency exchange regulations. Malaysia is mired in its first recession in over a 
decade and is under pressure to fend off the exodus of capital by maintaining a stable 
exchange rate to insure against speculative hedgng of funds. By lowering the interest 
sector. The measures, if strictly carAed out, could have a short-term, positive impact on 
tourism. Lowering the interest rate will allow tourism investors to borrow cheaply for 
their projects. Government officials hope that the ii~centives will reiuvenate manv poten- 
The controls also provide the government with a chance to implement structural reforms 
8 in the tourism sector. However. the lone-term effects of cavital controls on tourism 
1 remain a matter of some debate with a series of causes for concern. 
limit the amount of ringgits that investors can bring in and take out and if they require 
earning from stocks and shares to be kept in Malaysia for a year. CLOB, the Singapore 
market for Malaysian shares, was effectively killed when Malaysia introduced capital 
tember 15, 1998, were valued at RM$29.2 billion ( ~ ~ $ 7 . 6 8  billion). Malaysia had claimed 
that CLOB was being used for speculative attacks against its stock market, but the effects 
of it on tourism related investment have not been determined as yet. 
Also, the ultimatum to make RM$25 billion (US$6.57) in offshore ringgit valueless 
unless repatriated into Malaysia by September 30, 1998, is tantamount to blocking for- 
tight capital controls desirned to stem the outflow of funds will prevent existing foreim 
establishments and investments from taking cash out of the country. 
If the FDI for tourism projects declines, raising funds overseas will become difficult 
which will create the danger of the government being forced to print local money to fi- 
nance the projects. Printing a moderate amount of local money is acceptable so long as it 
does not pose the risk of causing inflation, but it could actually encourage this because 
tourism related projects are often extensive in scale and require substantial amounts of 
capital expenditure. Another danger of creating excess money is that it may flow into real 
estate and the stock market, causing the prices of properties and shares to go up artifi- 
cially. The bubble in unproductive sectors may thus start building up all over again. 
The FDI total into Malavsia for 1996 and 1997 was US$4.7 billion and US$3.8 billion 
related and without foreign direct investment, business will contract and unemployment 
in the tourism sector will rise. Unemployment can have an impact on the real estate 
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destinations. Table 1 provides details of hotel guest nights by orign in 1997 compared to 
recent arrival patterns. 
6! Table 1 
1996 and provides an indication of 
Malaysia: Hotel Guest Ni 
tinatiGwith more rhin $10 billion 
A A uu u 
When capital controls are imposec 
V 
Capital controls do represent a 
time, ~ a l a ~ s i ~  ha  to implement an 
J 
a's put its tourism business backJon 
economic policies. 
J I 
flate its economy too rapidly, espe 
ghts by Origin of Guests [19 96 versus 19971 
Country 1996 1997 
Singapore 2,354,600 2,663,500 
Japan 1,736,300 2,003,900 
Taiwan 978,500 1,103,700 
UK 936,700 1,103,100 
Australia 772,900 837,600 
Hong Kong 640,100 71 3,400 
USA 501,400 567,000 
China 486,600 713,400 
Germany 4 72,700 513,300 
Indonesia 373,200 511,900 
Others 3,209,900 3,947,000 
Source: Annual Report on Tourism 1997, Malaysian Tourism Board Kuala Lumpur 
i 
The present currency transfer approval system may cause a domino effect on neigh- 
boring countries. Malaysia is Singapore's first tourism destination and second largest 
trading partner. Singavore is also Malavsia's top tourism and real estate investment des- 
invisted thire. About 50 mil llion people pass through 
Malaysia's entry and exit points every year. Restricting money that can be carried out t o  
no more than RM$1,000 (US$263) in ringget or RM$10,000 (US$2,632) in foreign currency 
per person can breed smuggling and racketeering as reported in The Straits Times (1998). 
i, parallel or hack karkets in foreign exchange are 
likely to -develop. Among the more common factors in the development of an under- 
ground is the under-invoicing of exports and over-invoicing of imports. 
I V 
temporary measure to stop 
I 
the flight of capital. The 
I long- term implications for the tourism sector, however, are still unclear. In the mean- 
I economic policy that does n ot give an opportunity to 
speculators to respond -to perceived weaknesses in the econo&c system. The large 
amount of capital flight out of the country is often the symptom, and not the cause of 
speculation (Tavlor, 1997). Malavsia can correct the cause of currencv speculation as well 
track by removing the percei 
.I A 
ived inconsistencies in its 
Recommendations 
Malavsia can minimize these potential problems bv, firstlv, being careful not to re- 
I J ' J 
lcially since offshore ringgit 'depogts in the order of 
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Obviously Malaysia should look beyond its borders and seek regional partners in its 
attempt to control the exodus of capital. In view of the different developmental stages 
of the countries in its neighborhood, there is room for both vertical and horizontal link- 
ages and integration, which will increase the policy's effectiveness, although certain 
political barriers do exist to effective regional cooperation and coordination. 
Conclusion 
The Malaysian government wants to jump-start its economy by imposing capital 
controls to insulate the currency from speculation. As has been seen, capital controls can 
offer a temporary window of opportunity to stimulate and reform an economy. The gov- 
ernment has also sharply lowered interest rates, reduced bank reserve requirements, and 
instructed banks to maintain their lending growth at 8 percent. It declared two main 
objectives of capital controls: to maintain a stable exchange rate and to enable the govern- 
ment to pursue an easier interest rate policy in a bid to stimulate the ailing economy. 
However, these objectives cannot be achieved unless the economic inconsistencies 
are addressed. Capital controls are not a substitute for prudent macroeconomics policy. 
They do give a respite for banking reform and corporate restructuring without volatile 
exchange rates forcing the central bank to raise interest rates and slow down the econ- 
omy. There is, however, a danger that excessive expansion in domestic demand could 
lead to the deterioration of the trade balance, resulting in a loss of foreign reserves and 
capital flight. Malaysia should not allow its public and private companies to borrow 
extensively all over again. Supporting non-performing loans such as that for the Multi- 
media-Super-corridor, a prestige tourism and IT project, on the part of domestic banks 
will create the same problems that its neighbors face: asset bubbles, and over-investment 
in ambitious and unproductive projects. 
Other questions include whether Malaysia can afford to maintain its capital controls 
even if there is no global consensus to check the excesses of currency speculation and is it 
possible for the country to cut itself off indefinitely from global markets. More impor- 
tantly, what are the implications and consequences on economic sectors such as tourism 
if the capital controls are prolonged? 
In terms of tourism, capital controls may discourage investors and tourists alike and 
frustrate the achievement of targets set in the 1999 Budget based on the projected increase 
in hospitality and tourism earnings. The authorities might be described as creating ob- 
structions on the road to recovery, rather than lifting them. Tourism thus appears to have 
become the victim of both the financial crisis and strategies adopted in response to it. It 
will be interesting to monitor developments in Malaysia and the performance of the tour- 
ism industry as it continues to struggle to come to terms with the crisis and its aftermath. 
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